

CONSCRIPTION OF HOPLITES IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

φιλεῖ γὰρ ἄνδρας πόλεμος ἀγρεύειν νέους
War always hunts out young men (S. fr. 554 R)

Although Attic funeral orations praise the citizen-soldiers of Athens for embracing the opportunity to serve their city, hoplite service was compulsory throughout the Classical period.¹ The divergence between civic ideology and practice alerts us here, as elsewhere, to possible tensions within the city. Conscription in Athens was, in fact, a sensitive matter—as it continues to be in modern democracies (Cohen, 1985). Its compulsory aspect existed in tension with the personal freedom normally enjoyed by individuals. Furthermore, in distributing among citizens the obligation to risk life on the battlefield, it raised questions of fairness and equity to which Athenians, as political equals, were acutely attuned. Athenian arrangements for conscription are thus significant for our understanding not only of military institutions but also of democratic citizenship. Curiously, this intriguing facet of Athenian democracy has not received much attention in its own right. Scholars address conscription in Athens infrequently and then only briefly as it pertains to other subjects, especially Athenian demography. This paper seeks to fill this gap by reconstructing how conscription worked in Athens and locating it within its evolving historical context.

During the Classical period, Athenians used two different methods of conscription of which we know. At the time of the Peloponnesian War, the generals exercised considerable discretion in selecting whose names to post on the ten conscription lists (*katalogoi*), one for each tribe, that were compiled whenever a campaign was planned. By the mid-fourth century, however, the generals had begun keeping permanent records of potential hoplites by age-group and calling up entire groups to serve based exclusively on their age. Many questions remain unanswered concerning both systems and the transition between them. How exactly did the new arrangement differ from its predecessor? Was the transition gradual or abrupt? What were the motivations, practical and ideological, behind the change? What consequences did the reform have?

I will argue that the reform was implemented all at once sometime in the period 386–366 B.C. While it was important as a military reform since it sped up mobilization of the Athenian army, it was also significant as a democratic reform that provided a firm institutional basis for citizens taking turns in the risky enterprise of war. As such, I will suggest, it was consistent with other contemporary efforts to ensure that citizens carry out their civic duties equitably.

CONSCRIPTION BY *KATALOGOS*

As the hoplite phalanx grew in importance during the Archaic period, most Greek city-states probably made hoplite service mandatory for those who could afford armour and weapons. Whatever form conscription of hoplites took in Athens in this period, the reorganization of Athenians into ten tribes through the Cleisthenic

¹ Cavalry service was also by conscription: see esp. Bugh (1988), 52–5. Crews for the fleet were sometimes conscripted: see Amit (1965), 48–9; Jordan (1975), 101–3; Hansen (1985), 21–4; Rosivach (1985 [1992]), 41, with 56–7, n. 3; Gabrielsen (1994), 105–10, 248–9, n. 6.

reforms (508/7 B.C.) probably altered how it was administered. Henceforth, hoplites served within ten tribal contingents (Hdt. 6.111.1; Thuc. 6.98.4, 6.101.5; Lys. 16.15), and they were probably conscripted as well on the basis of these tribes.² Conscription by *katalogos*, which was carried out by Cleisthenic tribe as we shall see, may have been initiated at this time. While the first contemporary evidence for this type of conscription dates to the time of the Peloponnesian War, several later sources suggest it was operating before this. The problematic 'Decree of Themistocles', recorded in Troizen in the third century B.C., speaks of the generals enlisting (*καταλέξαι*) marines, who were conceivably hoplites, in 480 B.C. (*M.L.* 23.23–5; cf. Hamel, 1998a, 26, n. 74). The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* asserts that democratic reform was possible in the aftermath of Ephialtes' reforms (462 B.C.) in part because conscription *ἐκ καταλόγου* had fallen disproportionately on the city's 'better men' and seriously reduced their numbers (26.1); this implies that hoplites were called up by *katalogos* in the wars of the Delian League (cf. Rhodes, 1981, 326–7).³ Diodorus Siculus speaks of Myronides enlisting (*καταλέξας*) hoplites in 457 B.C. (11.81.4), and of Tolmides doing so in 456 B.C. (11.84.4–5).⁴

The process of conscription was set in motion whenever the Assembly voted in favour of a military campaign. The Assembly normally specified how many hoplites were to go on campaign and decided by vote which of the ten generals should lead it.⁵ The general or generals selected, probably aided by the other generals, was/were responsible for assembling the force. Volunteers for hoplite service were welcome (D.S. 11.84.4–5; Plu. *Per.* 18.2; cf. Ar. *Av.* 1364–9), as they were for the otherwise compulsory trierarchy, which the generals also administered.⁶ Individuals might volunteer to serve for a variety of reasons, including patriotism, lust for adventure, or desire for a wage. Some may have volunteered, however, because they reckoned that conscription was imminent and they would have a greater claim to honour as volunteers (D.S. 11.84.4; cf. X. *Eq. Mag.* 1.11–12). We must not, however, overestimate the willingness of Athenians to volunteer. Even when enthusiasm ran high, as for the doomed expedition to Sicily in 415 B.C. (Thuc. 6.24), conscription was still necessary (Thuc. 6.26.2, 6.31.3).

Conscription by *katalogos* involved several distinct phases: (i) compilation of lists of conscripts; (ii) notification of conscripts; (iii) granting of exemptions; (iv) muster.⁷

² On hoplites within the developing polis, see Raaflaub (1997); cf. id. (1996), 152–3. On Athenian hoplites in the sixth century B.C., see Manville (1990), 86–7, 162–3. Raaflaub (1992 [1995], 26, n. 69) collects bibliography on the military dimension of the Cleisthenic reforms.

³ Arist. *Pol.* 1303a8–10 makes a similar claim about the sociological impact of conscription by *katalogos* in connection with the Peloponnesian War.

⁴ D.S. 11.84.4–5 describes the process thrice with forms of *καταλέγω*, once with *διὰ τῶν καταλόγων*. Plu. *Per.* 18.2, recounting a different version of this episode, places it in 447 B.C.

⁵ On the Assembly's authority over the number of hoplites, see Hamel (1998a), 24–5, with 25, n. 68. On the appointment of generals to commands, see *ibid.*, 14–23.

⁶ On hoplite volunteers, see Kromayer and Veith (1928), 48; Pritchett (1974), 2.110–12; Andrewes (1981), 2. On conscription of trierarchs, see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; on voluntarism and the trierarchy, see Gabrielsen (1994), 68–73.

⁷ In reconstructing the phases of conscription by *katalogos*, I draw primarily on evidence concerning the period before 386 B.C., since—as I argue below—conscription by age-groups was instituted sometime in the period 386–366 B.C. Where I draw on evidence concerning arrangements after 386 B.C., I do so because in my view the shift to conscription by age-groups—though it altered fundamental aspects of its predecessor—probably did not change the specific practice in question.

1. *Compilation of lists*

The first task of the generals was to compile lists (*katalogoi*) of conscripts, one for each tribe. Each tribe's taxiarch was involved in compiling his tribe's list.⁸ Secretaries probably assisted in the process (MacDowell, 1994, 158). The entire board of generals may have been active in compiling lists, with each of the ten supervising a tribal list (MacDowell, 1994, 155). The fact that our sources often attribute the act of conscription to an individual general does not necessarily contradict this: a campaign's general(s) may have been primarily responsible for carrying out conscription even though aided by the other members of the board.⁹ Lysias 9 (*For the Soldier*) may provide evidence of collegial involvement: the speaker describes how he brought his claim for exemption before one of the generals (9.4), who turned it down, and how later 'the ones with Ctesicles the *archon*' (9.6) fined him when they heard that he was abusing them. Ctesicles is probably the general who turned down his claim; those 'with Ctesicles' are most likely generals, though it is not clear whether this refers to the entire board or a subset sharing a joint-command.¹⁰ Collaboration among the generals, working from their shared office (the *strategoion*) in or near the Agora, however, would have been sensible.¹¹ If each general, assisted by a tribal taxiarch, supervised one tribe's list of conscripts, this would make the compilation of lists less cumbersome.¹² Furthermore, their participation in this process would place the generals remaining behind in a good position to carry out any further conscription called for later in the same year.

Scholars have disputed what records were available for making lists of conscripts. A. H. M. Jones (1957, 163; cf. Dover, 1970 = *HCT* IV, 264) argues that the generals could draw on a permanent, central register (*katalogos*) of hoplites. Hansen (1985), however, argues that the central register is 'a modern fabrication' (83) and that '*katalogos* invariably denotes a roster drawn up for a particular campaign' (89) (cf. Hansen, 1981, 24–9). While Hansen has persuaded many scholars,¹³ Burckhardt (1996, 21, n. 31; cf. id., 1999) has recently defended the position that there was a central register on the grounds that many of the ancient testimonia could refer to this, since they are ambiguous, and that a central register would have made conscription much simpler.

In my view, however, the testimonia are not so ambiguous—their use of *katalogos* in

⁸ For the generals' involvement, see X. *H.G.* 1.1.34, 1.4.21; Lys. 9.15, 14.6; D.S. 11.81.4, 11.84.4–5, 15.26.2; cf. Plu. *Phoc.* 10.3–4. On the supporting role of taxiarchs, see Ar. *Pax* 1179–81; Lys. 15.5; cf. Poll. 8.115. Similarly, for much of the classical period each tribe's phylarch probably assisted the two hipparchs with lists of members of the cavalry from his tribe (cf. Lys. 16.6–7); by Aristotle's time, however, ten *katalogeis* were elected to help maintain the cavalry *katalogos* ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.2). On these arrangements for the cavalry, see Bugh (1988), 53–5, 169–73.

⁹ Conscription is attributed to individual generals in X. *H.G.* 1.1.34, 1.4.21; D.S. 11.81.4, 11.84.4–5, 15.26.2; cf. Plu. *Phoc.* 10.3–4.

¹⁰ For *archon* as *strategos*, see Lys. 15.5, 16.16; cf. Ael. *V.H.* 13.12; MacDowell (1994), 157. I am persuaded by Dreher (1994, 166–7) that those 'with Ctesicles' are generals—not secretaries as MacDowell (1994, 157–60) suggests. For other possible clues of collegial involvement, see Lys. 9.15, 14.6, 15.7.

¹¹ On the *strategoion*, see Wycherley (1957), 174–7; Thompson and Wycherley (1972), 73; Wycherley (1978), 46; Camp (1992), 116–18.

¹² Throughout the period when one general was selected from each tribe, each general naturally would have supervised his tribe's own list. It is controversial how long this period lasted: see Hamel (1998a), 85–7.

¹³ Those following Hansen include Hornblower (1991), 256; MacDowell (1994), 158, n. 10; Hamel (1998a), 24, n. 67.

the singular, as I will argue below, does not even hint at the existence of a central register. Furthermore, while it is true that a central register would have facilitated conscription, the Athenians and their generals at this time may have been daunted by the difficulties involved in establishing and maintaining such records. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, a register would have had to keep track of as many as 18,000–24,000 potential hoplites, a group with considerable turnover due to death or disability from natural causes or warfare.¹⁴ The bureaucratic challenge would have been formidable, requiring the general's office to act throughout the year as a census bureau of sorts in addition to carrying out its numerous other duties: it was one thing to maintain a permanent *katalogos* of the 1000 members of the cavalry, as the Athenians may have done at this time, but quite another to keep track of the much larger group of potential hoplites in this way.¹⁵

It is quite plausible, therefore, that the generals had recourse to a method of collecting names that was less onerous—at least for them. When a campaign was voted, they issued a call to the demarchs (cf. Dem. 50.6) to submit names of individuals eligible for service as indicated by the deme registers—the *lexiarchika grammateia*. IG I³ 138 (c. 440 B.C.?) indicates that these registers identified members of the cavalry and probably also men liable to service as hoplites—'hoplites' is a restoration accepted by most scholars.¹⁶ If the lists submitted by the demarchs also marked, for example, those who were permanently disabled, this could have saved the generals considerable trouble in drawing up the *katalogoi*.¹⁷ The demarchs may have submitted either complete lists with any annotations or shorter, screened lists of those actually able to serve. While such lists ideally would provide an up-to-date picture of qualified individuals based on local knowledge, there was some risk of abuse on the part of local officials (cf. Dem. 57.58–60), especially if they submitted screened lists.

After the generals had received lists of names from the demes, they were in a position to make up their *katalogoi* for the current campaign. While the generals

¹⁴ For these figures, see Rhodes (1988), 274, who is extrapolating from Thuc. 2.13.6. On Athenian demography, see also Hansen (1985; 1988; 1991, 86–94); cf. Sekunda (1992), with Hansen's response (1994).

¹⁵ Although a permanent cavalry *katalogos* is not unambiguously attested before the late-fourth century (see above, n. 8), the administration of the city's long-term loan (*katastasis*) to recruits for purchasing mounts (see Bugh, 1988, 56–8) would call for central record-keeping of some kind. Gabrielsen (1994, 68–73) argues that the *katalogoi* listing trierarchs were *ad hoc* rather than permanent.

The Syracusans may have kept a central list of citizens at this time: according to Plu. *Nic.* 14.6–7, the Athenians captured such a list, which the Syracusans had intended to use for 'determining and enrolling those who had come to military age'.

¹⁶ On the nature of the *lexiarchika grammateia*, see Hansen (1985), 14–15 and Whitehead (1986), 35–6, n. 130. On their possible use in conscription, see Hansen (1985), 85; Bugh (1988), 55; Sekunda (1992), 324; cf. Whitehead (1986), 134. The 'Decree of Themistocles' requires the generals to use these in manning the fleet (*M.L.* 23.27–31): see Jameson (1963), 399–400 and Whitehead (1986), 35–6, n. 130, 134, n. 79. On IG I³ 138, see Jameson (1980); Whitehead (1986), 35–6, n. 130, 135; Bugh (1988), 55.

¹⁷ The city did not have a central registry of all disabled men; it kept track only of those who received financial support from it because they were indigent and could not work: see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.4; Rhodes (1981), 570; cf. Dillon (1995). Hansen (1985, 20–1) argues that the *lexiarchika grammateia* did not exclude the names of the disabled.

While it would have been useful for the generals to receive information from the demes concerning the ages of those on the registers, we have no evidence that the deme registers contained this information. Whitehead (1986, 35–6, n. 130) is rightly sceptical of Effenterre's speculation that the deme registers went so far as to list demesmen by age-groups for purposes of conscription (Effenterre, 1976, 15; cf. 11).

probably had to ensure that the same number of individuals was selected from each tribe so that each of the ten tribal contingents would be the same size (cf. Sekunda, 1992, 341), they had broad discretion in selecting which hoplites to conscript from each tribe. Because most expeditions required only a fraction of all eligible hoplites, the generals, aided by the tribal taxiarchs, were free to select individuals they deemed especially capable (Thuc. 6.31.3; D.S. 11.84.4; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1; Arist. *Pol.* 1303a8–10).¹⁸ When the generals and their staff had exhausted what they knew of eligible hoplites personally or by report—as must often have been the case where large expeditions were involved (cf. Gabrielsen, 1994, 243, n. 15), they may have selected more or less randomly from among vigorous men.

Our sources are clear that the generals made up lists (*katalogoi*) in the plural (Thuc. 6.26.2, 6.31.3; D.S. 11.84.4), one for each of the ten tribes. There is no reason to assume, as Hansen apparently does (1985, 85, 89), that a single, campaign-specific roster was ever compiled from these *katalogoi*. A composite roster would have been considerably less useful than the ten tribal *katalogoi*, since individuals were called up to serve and reported for muster by tribe (see below).¹⁹ Consistent with this is the fact that Athenians do not seem to have used *katalogos* collectively of either a composite roster for a particular campaign or a permanent register. When *katalogos* is used concretely, it can always be understood as referring to one of the ten tribal *katalogoi* generated for a specific campaign. While it is natural to take *katalogos* as a tribal list when sources speak of a tribal taxiarch's responsibility for maintaining it (Lys. 15.5; cf. Poll. 8.115), the tribal *katalogos* also probably lies behind the use of *katalogos* in other contexts as well.

The prepositional phrase *ἐκ καταλόγου*, which is frequently used to explain how a hoplite came to serve on a campaign, is best taken as an adverb (cf. LSJ *ἐκ* III.8) derived from the fact that conscription was carried out through the tribal *katalogos*. Thus, when Thucydides describes the Athenian preparations for the Sicilian expedition, he speaks first of the compilation of *katalogoi* (*καταλόγους ἐποιοῦντο*: 6.26.2; *τὸ δὲ πεζὸν καταλόγοις τε χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθέν*: 6.31.3) and later refers to the hoplites conscripted in this way as *ἐκ καταλόγου* (6.43; cf. 7.16.1, 7.20.2, 8.24.2). Thucydides naturally conveys the most precise information about the process of conscription, namely the compilation of *katalogoi*, when describing the preparations in progress; later, when he succinctly lists the different troops going on the expedition, he describes the Athenian hoplites thus selected by the shorthand *ἐκ καταλόγου*. Thucydides does not imply by the use of the singular that Athenians, having made the multiple *katalogoi*, then combined them into a single roster for the campaign; nor is he providing new information at this late stage about a central register from which the

¹⁸ Thuc. 6.31.3 says of the high quality of the hoplites selected to go on the Sicilian expedition, *τὸ δὲ πεζὸν καταλόγοις τε χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθέν*. In my view, Dover (1970 = *HCT* IV, 295) is mistaken in construing *καταλόγοις* . . . *χρηστοῖς* as “‘honest’ registers”, i.e. accurate ones. In context, Thucydides’ point is that the best troops were selected from the *katalogoi* (cf. 7.64.1), just as earlier in the same section he asserts that the city provided the best possible petty officers for the fleet; *χρηστοῖς*, an attribute of the hoplites sought out, has simply been transferred to the lists on which their names appeared.

Andrewes (1981, 1, 3, n. 2; cf. Hansen, 1985, 85) assumes that, when *καταλέγω* is used of this type of conscription, this conveys its selective character. In fact, *καταλέγω* does not appear to be used in the active voice to mean ‘select’ until later (LSJ s.v. [B] 1.4). It is therefore probably best translated simply as ‘enlist’, i.e. to place an individual’s name on a *katalogos*.

¹⁹ Likewise, when casualty lists were compiled and posted after a campaign, they took the form of tribal lists: see Bradeen (1969); Clairmont (1983), 1.48, 50–1; Loraux (1986), 22–3.

katalogoi were compiled. Similarly, we hear that Athenians in connection with a naval expedition in 362/1 B.C. voted that the members of the Boule and demarchs should make *katalogoi* of their demesmen and list available sailors (Dem. 50.6); later these conscripts are described as 'those who had come to the ships ἐκ καταλόγου' (50.16). Here, as in Thucydides, ἐκ καταλόγου is a concise way to describe conscription earlier specified as being carried out by *katalogoi* (cf. Hansen, 1985, 86).

If ἐκ καταλόγου has its origins in the practice of posting an individual's name on a tribal *katalogos*, once it entered common usage Athenians may have taken it as equivalent to 'by (the system of) conscription' without identifying it very closely with the tribal *katalogos*. Thus Xenophon's Nicomachides laments that the Athenians did not elect him as general: 'I who have been worn down going on expeditions by conscription' (ὅς ἐκ καταλόγου στρατευόμενος κατατέτριμμαι) (*Mem.* 3.4.1). In this generalizing context, the idea of any particular list is remote and ἐκ καταλόγου means simply that the speaker on each occasion had been conscripted; the same idea is frequently expressed verbally, e.g. κατελέγην στρατιώτης (*Lys.* 9.4; cf. 14.7, 15.11, 32.5).²⁰ As no abstract noun had been coined to describe this system of conscription, it was natural for Athenians to stretch the concrete noun *katalogos*, which was used to refer to the *ad hoc* tribal list, to designate this as well.

2. Notification of conscripts

After the generals had compiled the *katalogoi* for a campaign, their next task was to notify conscripts. The standard practice was to post the ten *katalogoi* on notice-boards (Ar. *Av.* 450) attached to the base of the Eponymoi—the statues of the ten eponymous heroes of the tribes located in the Agora; each tribal *katalogos* was displayed below the corresponding tribal hero (Ar. *Pax* 1183–4).²¹ Each list may have been subdivided by deme—the form in which lists came to the generals—to aid those consulting it.²² Like other temporary notices, each list was probably written in charcoal on whitened wood.²³ Because this medium was readily erasable (cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 48.1), the taxiarchs could adjust the *katalogoi* at any point in the process—hence the comic complaint that the taxiarchs arbitrarily add some names and erase others 'two or three times' (Ar. *Pax* 1180–1; cf. *Eq.* 1369–72). Once the *katalogoi* were posted, the taxiarchs could delete names as exemptions were granted; to discourage individuals from erasing their own or others' names, the generals probably kept a copy out of mischief's way in their office. The generals must have posted a notice in the same location specifying when and where conscripts were to present themselves for muster (cf. D.S. 11.81.4–5) and what to bring with them (cf. Ar. *Pax* 1181–2)—the standard order was to bring 'provisions for three days'.²⁴

²⁰ Andrewes (1981, 2–3) suggests that ἐκ καταλόγου may refer to 'the system by which generals made up their own κατάλογοι for particular expeditions' in Arist. *Pol.* 1303a8–10, [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1, and (3 n. 2) X. *Mem.* 3.4.1.

²¹ On the original monument, which was erected c. 430 B.C., and its mid-fourth-century successor in a different location, see Shear (1970); Wycherley (1978), 52–3; Camp (1992), 97–100.

²² Cf. the use of deme captions in ephebic inscriptions in the late fourth century: see Reinmuth (1971), 83–4.

²³ This was the medium initially used for lists under the later arrangement of conscription by age-groups ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.4). The 'Decree of Themistocles' requires the generals to post the names of crew members on whitened tablets (*M.L.* 23.27–31). On the use of this medium for temporary notices, see Rhodes (1981), 555.

²⁴ Ar. *Ach.* 197; *Pax* 311–12; Eub. fr. 19.3 K–A; cf. Ar. *V.* 242–3; Thuc. 1.48.1; see Pritchett (1971), 1.33; cf. Olson (1998), 134. For extended parody of a hoplite's response to orders to march, see Ar. *Ach.* 1073–1142.

The generals probably also took more active steps to ensure that individuals knew they had been conscripted so that there would be no excuse for failing to appear for service. In particular, the generals could not assume that hoplites who lived outside the city centre and up to a long day's walk from it (cf. N. F. Jones, 1999, 97–100) would be present in the city to consult the posted notices (cf. Ar. *Pax* 1181–6). Heralds, therefore, may have announced that *katalogoi* had been posted and should be checked by those eligible for hoplite service (cf. Ar. *Pax* 311–12, *Ach.* 1083; Plu. *Phoc.* 24.4), just as they summoned citizens to arms in emergencies (And. 1.45). Another possibility is that trumpet-calls, which were also used for summoning citizens in emergencies (Bacchyl. 18.1; And. 1.45; cf. Polyae. 3.9.20; Dem. 18.169), summoned Athenians to check the *katalogoi*.²⁵

3. Granting of exemptions

While the generals probably found it expedient to incorporate some categories of exemptions into the lists they posted, inevitably they listed some individuals who believed that they qualified for release from service. The burden was on an individual to assert and prove his claim to exemption.²⁶ The normal procedure for making a claim was to approach the generals at their office before the time of mustering (Lys. 9.4). If an individual could not come to the generals' office due to disability or absence abroad, presumably a delegate could represent him (cf. Aesch. 2.94–5; Dem. 19.124).

Release from hoplite service could be granted on numerous grounds recognized by custom or statute.²⁷ First, a conscript could assert that he did not meet the basic criteria of age and wealth. In Aristotle's time, individuals aged 18–59 were eligible for hoplite service (*Ath. Pol.* 53.4; cf. Plu. *Phoc.* 24.4). The first two age-groups undergoing the *ephebeia*, however, did not serve abroad and were kept separate from the others (*Ath. Pol.* 42.4–5; Hansen, 1985, 37, with 100, n. 125; cf. Rhodes, 1988, 271); men over the age of 50 were probably not normally conscripted for service abroad (cf. Lyc. 1.39; Hansen, 1985, 17).²⁸ Although the evidence for earlier practice is not clear, the age-range of eligibility for hoplite service may have been the same, as well as the practice of passing over the youngest and oldest hoplites for service abroad—Thucydides speaks of the 'oldest and youngest' as part of the home guard (2.13.7; cf. Lys. 2.50–53; D.S. 13.72.5).²⁹

²⁵ The number of soundings could distinguish a call to all citizens to appear with arms in a general emergency from a call to men of hoplite status to consult the *katalogoi*. On the diverse military uses of the *salpinx*, see Krentz (1991).

²⁶ This was also the case with individuals seeking release from cavalry service ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.2) or liturgies, including the *choregia* (56.3) and trierarchy (61.1)—cf. Gabrielsen (1994), 85–90.

²⁷ See esp. Hansen (1985), 16–21; cf. Sekunda (1992), 346–8.

²⁸ Men in their sixtieth year were called on to be *diatetai* from 399/8 B.C. (see MacDowell, 1971, 267–73) and were presumably exempt during their term (Hansen, 1991, 100). In Sparta eligibility for active service also extended for forty years: X. *H.G.* 5.4.13, 6.4.17. Plato thus could be thinking of Sparta or Athens in *Leg.* 785b6–7 when he proposes that men be eligible for military service from the age of 20 up until 60 (i.e. through the age of 59: see below, n. 50), not necessarily Athens as Hansen (1985, 100, n. 125) suggests.

²⁹ A. H. M. Jones (1957, 163; cf. Rhodes, 1988, 271) may be right that by the 'youngest' Thucydides means those aged 18 and 19. I doubt, however, that Jones (163–4) is correct in believing that men between the ages of 40 and 49 were usually part of the home-guard; this seems rather young for automatic posting to the home guard—cf. X. *H.G.* 6.1.5 on the use of older soldiers in citizen armies.

The amount of wealth required for hoplite service was less precise than the age-parameters for it (cf. MacDowell, 1978, 160). In the fifth century, an individual had to be wealthy enough to afford hoplite equipment (cf. Luc. *Tim.* 51), which was expensive. In the fourth century, however, two factors may have made hoplite service more accessible to the less wealthy: hoplites came to use less equipment and at some point the state began providing shield and spear ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.4) (Hansen, 1985, 49).³⁰ Because it was difficult to know precisely how wealthy a man was in Classical Athens (Gabrielsen, 1986), it must have been hard to evaluate claims to exemption from hoplite service—or cavalry service (cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.2)—based on insufficient wealth. The best evidence that a man could afford to serve as hoplite was that he or his father had served previously; an individual seeking exemption probably had to convince the generals that his financial situation had changed dramatically.³¹

Individuals who met the basic requirements for hoplite service could seek exemption on numerous other grounds. Many officeholders, including all 500 members of the Council (Lyc. 1.37), were exempt. So too were tax-collectors (*telonai*) (Dem. 59.27; cf. 21.166), chorus members (Dem. 21.15, 39.16; MacDowell, 1989), and probably also *choregoi* (cf. Dem. 21.103, with MacDowell, 1990, 9).³² Members of the cavalry (Lys. 16.13; cf. 14.14) and probably active trierarchs (Dem. 21.166, with MacDowell, 1990, 385) were exempt. Individuals just back from a hoplite campaign could seek exemption (Lys. 9.4, 15: see below). Exemption could be granted on the grounds of temporary or permanent disability, physical or mental. Extraordinary personal hardship must sometimes have resulted in exemption. Athenians living or travelling abroad were probably exempt from service.³³ In some cases the generals may have allowed individuals exemption only temporarily, expecting them to join an expedition in progress later (Dem. 39.16–17; cf. MacDowell, 1989, 71–2). The generals may have required a claimant to swear an oath that he indeed qualified for exemption; this practice is attested for individuals before the Council seeking exemption from the

³⁰ It is controversial, however, whether thetes ever became eligible for hoplite service. Hansen (1985, 48–9, 88–9; cf. Sekunda, 1992, 345–6) believes they did; Rhodes (1981, 503) doubts this.

³¹ The city's practice of bestowing panoplies on hoplites' orphans at the age of 18 (Pl. *Mx.* 249a6–b2; Aesch. 3.154) served a practical, as well as an ideological, function—namely ensuring that orphans would be equipped to serve as hoplites. Whereas surviving hoplites may frequently have passed their equipment on to their sons, the equipment of dead hoplites was often lost on the battlefield (Hansen, 1989, 205; cf. 63–5).

³² Hansen (1985, 17) suggests '1,000 men is a suitably cautious estimate of the *archai* and other officials of whom those of draft age would be exempted'. In Sparta too officeholders were normally exempt from service: see X. *H.G.* 6.4.17.

³³ *Disability.* Baldwin (1967) discusses medical exemptions in Athens and elsewhere. On bogus claims, see below, n. 36.

Hardship. One's house burning down might qualify as a hardship: see the anecdotes concerning Meton and his son in Plu. *Nic.* 13.7–8 and *Alc.* 17.5–6. Sekunda (1992, 347) believes that 'those currently engaged in litigation' were exempt, but the evidence he cites (And. 4.22) does not speak directly to this. One clue that involvement in litigation may have been grounds for release, however, is found in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.5: ephebes were barred from most litigation so they would not have an 'excuse for being absent' from service.

Absence abroad. Sekunda (1992, 347–8) discusses cleruchs, mercenaries, exiles, and traders under this rubric. While the rules governing absence abroad are not known, it was very likely grounds for exemption from military service just as it was from other civic obligations (Dem. 14.16; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.5). I am not persuaded by Sekunda (348) that Athenians abroad 'made considerable efforts to join the army, even if they could have avoided conscription had they so wished'; Sekunda draws this inference from Xenophon's efforts in 362 B.C. to send his sons to Athens to join in the expedition supporting Sparta (D.L. 2.53), but this is more likely evidence of Xenophon's philolaconism than of typical behaviour of Athenians abroad.

cavalry on the grounds of poverty or disability ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.2; cf. Dem. 19.124, with MacDowell, 2000, 256).

The total number of individuals eligible for conscription on the basis of age and wealth but exempt on one of these grounds was probably considerable. Hansen (1985, 17–20) has estimated that some 5 per cent of individuals likely to be called up may have been exempt on the basis of office-holding or other service to the city, and at least 20 per cent on the grounds of physical incapacity—to judge from comparative data from modern states.³⁴ When the generals compiled their *katalogoi*, they had somehow to take into account the large number of exempt persons. They could call up many more individuals than needed, anticipating that a large number would prove exempt, or they could seek to produce higher-yield lists by leaving manifestly ineligible persons, for example officeholders, off the lists. Even in the latter case, however, the generals could not anticipate all who might claim exemption or who might not show up for service, so they had good reason to list more conscripts than actually required.³⁵

The generals had little choice but to honour exemptions that were unambiguously established by statute, as was probably the case with those applying to officeholders. While they had greater discretion in judging exemptions based on disabilities, they had no reason to force service on the manifestly unfit: the rigours of service as hoplite and interdependence of the force demanded a high level of physical ability. Nonetheless, the generals probably looked closely at claims of disability, since these could be fraudulent, as was widely recognized.³⁶ A possible strategy for the generals to adopt under questionable circumstances was to allow the exemption only if the claimant could provide a substitute.³⁷

Just how hard it might be to win exemption is illustrated by the case of Lysias' client Polyaeus, who was prosecuted for failure to pay a fine that the generals imposed on him for verbally abusing them after they denied his exemption claim. According to Polyaeus, when he was conscripted, he protested to one of the generals that he had

³⁴ Sekunda (1992, 347) argues on the basis of his analysis of the Athenian mobilization for the Lamian War that 'the rate of military exemption may have been as low as 8 per cent, covering all categories of exemption'. I am more inclined, however, to trust Hansen's comparative data than Sekunda's calculations based on fragmentary ephebic documents and figures preserved in Diodorus Siculus (18.11.3, with 18.10.2).

³⁵ Cf. Demosthenes' suggestion (14.16) concerning the trierarchic *summoriai* that one should start with 2000 names if one seeks 1200 after exemptions are granted.

³⁶ Note, for example, the proverb preserved in Ant. 87 B 57 D–K: '“Illness provides cowards with a holiday”—for they do not march forth to action' (*νόσος δειλοῖσιν ἑορτή*: οὐ γὰρ ἐκπορεύονται ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν). Feigned madness figures prominently in Athenian reflection on draft-evasion. Sophocles' *Odysseus Mainomenos* apparently treated Odysseus' failed attempt to evade service in the Trojan War in this way; cf. A. *Ag.* 841–2; S. *Ph.* 1025–8. Meton allegedly pretended to be mad to win release from the Sicilian expedition (Ael. *V.H.* 13.12; Plu. *Nic.* 13.7–8; *Alc.* 17.5–6).

³⁷ Cf. how, when Aeschines claimed he was too sick to serve on an embassy to which he had been named, the Council sent his brother in his place (Dem. 19.124; cf. Aesch. 2.94–5). As far as we know, however, conscripted hoplites in Athens were not routinely allowed to provide substitutes as was common, for example, in the American Civil War (Chambers, 1975, 171–81; Cohen, 1985, 138–40, 145–6). Designated trierarchs sometimes arranged privately for others to serve in their place on ship (Gabielsen, 1994, 181). *Antidosis* provided a legal procedure for reluctant trierarchs and other liturgists to formally transfer their obligations to others: see Gabielsen (1987) and Christ (1990).

Our sources speak of substitution as an option in a variety of contexts: X. *H.G.* 3.4.15, *Ages.* 1.24, Plu. *Ages.* 9.3–5 (all in connection with Agesilaus' recruitment of cavalry); Pl. *Leg.* 878c5–d3 (proposing that a man who injures another must serve in his place); H. *Il.* 23.294–9 (a horse substituted for a man!).

been called up within two months of returning from another military expedition (9.4). This, he asserts, violated the generals' oath that 'they would enlist individuals who had not served' (τοὺς ἀστρατεύτους καταλέγειν 9.15); presumably, this means that they swore to enlist first individuals who had not served recently or perhaps within the current year (MacDowell, 1994, 155). The generals, however, justified their action on the grounds that 'Polyaenus had not been in the city for less time than Callicrates' (9.5), who apparently had also been conscripted to serve in the current campaign (MacDowell, 1994, 155).³⁸ While the generals' argument may not have been flawless—Callicrates' presence on the *katalogoi* does not prove that they had fully met their obligation to seek conscripts first from among the *astrateutoi*—Polyaenus probably complied rather than face imprisonment (9.5) (MacDowell, 1994, 156).

4. Muster

While almost any area of sufficient capacity could be used for mustering troops, locations close to the city centre were probably favoured, since many hoplites lived near the centre and the Agora was available for provisioning. The Agora, which served in emergencies as a collecting point for citizens in arms (And. 1.45; Polyaen. 3.9.20), was probably used sometimes as a place of muster for hoplites setting out on expeditions. One advantage of mustering here was that the generals could make direct use of the *katalogoi* posted at the Eponymoi by having conscripts line up in front of their tribe's heroes to be checked off against each tribe's list. The Lyceum, however, is attested as a location for mustering hoplites and may have been used frequently. The Pnyx, with its large capacity and elevated platform (*bema*) from which generals could review the troops, may also have served this purpose on occasion.³⁹

At muster the generals had to ensure that all conscripts not granted exemptions appeared for service. Each tribe's taxiarch was responsible for marking down on his tribe's *katalogos* any no-shows (Poll. 8.115: οἱ μέντοι ταξίαρχοι ἀναγεγραμμένους ἔχοντες τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ καταλόγου, παρεσημαίνοντο τὰ τῶν ἀφυστερούντων ὀνόματα· καὶ τοῦτο παραστίζειν ἐκαλεῖτο). A fragment from Sophocles' *The Gathering of the Achaeans* describing the 'conscription' of Greeks for the Trojan War is probably based on this phase of Athenian conscription: 'But do you on your chair who hold the tablets with the writing mark off (νέμ') any who has sworn the oath but is not present' (fr. 144 R).⁴⁰ The generals could also grant last-minute exemptions at this point, to judge from

³⁸ W. R. M. Lamb (*Lysias* [Cambridge, MA, 1930], 186) suggests a different interpretation of Lys. 9.5: 'Apparently Polyaenus had complained that a man named Callicrates, who had not been enlisted, had enjoyed a longer leave at home than himself.' While this is possible, Polyaenus makes no mention of Callicrates when describing his initial complaint to the general, as one might have expected him to do if this had been an integral part of it.

³⁹ *Agora*. See Siewert (1982), 58–9, 150–3. The *horoi* with names of tribes and *trittyes* found here may have been used when citizens assembled for mustering and other purposes: see Raubitschek (1956), 282 and Siewert (1982), 10, 142. Those found in the Piraeus may have been used for assembling citizens serving in the fleet: Gabrielsen (1994), 72, with 243, n.10.

Lyceum. Ar. Pax 355–6; X. H.G. 1.1.33; Hsch. s.v. Λύκειον (λ 1380); Phot. s.v. (λ 234); Suda s.v. (λ 801); cf. Jameson (1980), 224–7; Siewert (1982), 59, n. 13; Olson (1998), 144.

Pnyx. Plu. Phoc. 10.3–4 (Phocion apparently oversees the muster of troops from a *bema*, perhaps that of the Assembly); cf. 15.1–2, 24.3–5.

Other possible locations. Agora of Hippodamus in Piraeus: And. 1.45. Anaceum: Thuc. 8.93.1; Polyaen. 1.21.2; cf. And. 1.45 (for cavalry). Theseum: And. 1.45 and Thuc. 6.61.2; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.4 (but probably an error: see Rhodes, 1981, 210–11).

⁴⁰ The translation is that of H. Lloyd-Jones (*Sophocles: Fragments* [Cambridge, MA, 1996]). νέμ' could perhaps mean 'read off' (Hsch. s.v. νέμω = ν 290).

an anecdote concerning Phocion and the much-maligned orator Aristogeiton: when Aristogeiton 'approached the place of muster (ἐν δὲ τῷ καταλόγῳ) leaning on a staff and with both legs bandaged', Phocion cried out, 'Write down Aristogeiton too as lame and worthless' (Plu. *Phoc.* 10.3–4).⁴¹ Once the generals knew how many conscripts had appeared for service, they may have needed to make some adjustments. If the generals had underestimated the yield from the *katalogoi*, more individuals might appear than the Assembly had authorized and some would have to be sent home. If they had overestimated the yield, they could make last-minute efforts to fill their ranks; they might, however, determine to march without a full contingent (D.S. 11.81.4–6; cf. Plu. *Mor.* 185f6–186a3).⁴²

Any conscript who failed to appear at muster was liable to indictment (*graphe*) for draft-dodging (*astrateia*) (Lys. 14.6–7). Such cases, if pursued, were heard later by a special jury composed of the soldiers who had gone out on the campaign in question (Lys. 14.5, 15, 17; cf. Dem. 39.17), with the generals presiding (Lys. 15.1–2).⁴³ The postponement of such trials made sense not only because this kept the departing army from being delayed but because the returning army could efficiently judge these suits along with closely related ones alleging misbehaviour on campaign—abandoning the ranks or cowardice—over which they also had jurisdiction (Lys. 14.5). The generals remaining at home, however, may have exercised their authority to 'bind', that is imprison, draft-dodgers (Lys. 9.5) until the army returned from campaign.

Conscription by *katalogos* appears to have worked relatively well. Under this system, Athens successfully fielded large hoplite forces during the Peloponnesian War. While the generals may sometimes have set out without full contingents, as far as we know they were not forced to cancel any expedition because of this. If the system worked, however, it had two shortcomings: it was difficult to mobilize troops quickly; and the discretion exercised by the generals in selecting troops could appear arbitrary and unfair.

Conscription by *katalogos* was not designed to work with great speed: it must have been time-consuming to gather lists of eligible hoplites from the demes and then to select conscripts from these. Athenians may have accepted this defect because normally speedy mobilization was not essential. As long as the Assembly voted well in advance of the summer campaign season to launch an expedition, this left the generals sufficient time to conscript troops.⁴⁴ Where military objectives warranted it, moreover,

⁴¹ I follow B. Perrin (*Plutarch's Lives* VIII [Cambridge, MA, 1919]) in translating τῷ καταλόγῳ as 'place of muster'. The location may be the Pnyx: see above, n. 39.

⁴² A. H. M. Jones (1957, 178) suggests that the Athenians may have set out for Delium in 424 B.C. without a full contingent since 'many hoplites in outlying demes may not have received their summons in time'.

⁴³ On indictment for draft-dodging, see Lipsius (1905–15), 452–4. Our sources sometimes tendentiously characterize *astrateia* as *lipotaxion*: see Hamel (1998b), 362–85. Dem. 39.17 suggests that taxiarchs could receive charges and 'bring them into court' (*eisagein*). This may mean that under some circumstances taxiarchs presided over the court (Carey and Reid, 1985, 180; but cf. Harrison, 1971, 2.32–3, with 33, n. 1); if so they were probably acting under the ultimate authority of the generals. Individuals convicted of draft-evasion were subject to *atimia*, though this may not have been strictly enforced: see Dem. 21.58–60, with MacDowell (1989), 72–4, 77, and id. (1990), 278–81.

⁴⁴ On the timing of the summer campaign season, see Osborne (1987), 13–14; cf. Rosivach (1985 [1992]), 53–5.

hoplites (Thuc. 2.31.1, 3.91.4; Lys. 3.45; cf. D.S. 15.26.2) or all able-bodied men (Thuc. 4.94.1) could be called upon to take the field *en masse*.⁴⁵

A further problem with conscription by *katalogos* was that the generals' discretion in selecting hoplites could lead to the impression of inequitable treatment—a sensitive matter within Athenian democracy. One possible complaint was that young men were passed over while 'old men' served (And. 4.22; cf. Ar. *Ach.* 598–614; *V.* 1114–21, with 1099–1101). Behind this hyperbole lies an important reality. While the generals must have drafted younger men frequently since they were especially likely to be vigorous (D.S. 11.84.4), they could draft any man they deemed fit, regardless of age. In fact, to ensure a good mix of veterans within the ranks, the generals must sometimes have selected an 'older'—relatively speaking at least—man over a younger and less experienced one. It was thus almost inevitable under this system of selective conscription that some younger men remained behind while older men served. Another source of friction was the impression that the generals gave preferential treatment to their friends and influential persons: indeed, it lay within the generals' authority not to put an individual on the *katalogoi* in the first place, or, if the individual had already been listed, to strike his name from the list on the grounds, for example, that he was qualified to serve in the cavalry (Lys. 15.5–6; cf. Ar. *Eq.* 1369–72)—a safer branch of service. There may be some truth to the common claim that politicians evaded military service (e.g. Cleonymus: Ar. *Eq.* 1369–72, with Storey, 1989; Peisander: X. *Smp.* 2.14; cf. Ar. *Av.* 1556–8; Eup. fr. 35 K–A): given their close relationships with generals, whose elections they could help secure, they were in an excellent position to ask for and receive preferential treatment. It is against this backdrop of suspicions and concerns that we should read the frequent treatment of draft-evasion in Attic drama: tragedians treated the problem of *astrateia* in connection with the Trojan War;⁴⁶ Aristophanes often alludes to *astrateia* and Eupolis apparently focused on it in his *Astrateutoi* (cf. Storey, 1989). Whatever the actual level of draft-dodging, Athenians were concerned about it and the threat it posed to the city.

While Athenians used conscription by *katalogos* for a long time, sometime in the period 386–366 B.C. they altered fundamentally how conscription was carried out. After considering the features of the new system and the evidence concerning the date of its inception, I will attempt to place it in its historic context by exploring the military and ideological considerations behind its introduction.

CONSCRIPTION BY AGE-GROUPS

The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* digresses from its treatment of arbitrators to describe the system of conscription operating at the time of its composition (c. 330 B.C.):

Men who are fifty-nine years old serve as arbitrators, as is clear from the arrangements involving archons and eponymous heroes. While the eponymous heroes of the tribes are ten in number, there are forty-two assigned to the age-groups eligible for military service [i.e. 18–59

⁴⁵ A. H. M. Jones (1957, 178) points out the flexibility of the terms *πανδημεί* and *πανστρατιᾷ*, which are sometimes applied to levies that are clearly less than full as in Thuc. 2.31.1.

⁴⁶ Sophocles, *Odysseus Mainomenos* (see above, n. 36); Euripides, *Skyrioi* (based on Achilles' famous cross-dressing dodge—see esp. fr. 683a N² Suppl.). Cf. the apparent popularity of tragedies concerned with recruiting: Sophocles' *Skyrioi* treated difficulties surrounding the recruitment of Neoptolemus (fr. 554 R, quoted at this article's opening, is from this tragedy); Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides each wrote a *Philoctetes* exploring the problematic 'recruitment' of the title hero.

year olds]. Formerly, when ephebes were enrolled, their names were written on whitened tablets (*γραμματεία*), and above them the archon in office when they were enrolled and the eponymous hero of the age-group that had served as arbitrators in the previous year. Now, however, ephebes' names are inscribed on a bronze *stèle*, which is set up in front of the Bouleuterion beside the Eponymoi. . . . They also use the eponymous heroes in connection with military expeditions: whenever they send men of a certain age on an expedition, they post a notice that indicates by archons and eponymous heroes the range of age-groups that must serve (*προγράφουσιν ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχοντος καὶ ἐπωνύμου μέχρι τίνων δεῖ στρατεύεσθαι*). (53.4, 7)

The system described here diverges conspicuously from conscription by *katalogos* (cf. 26.1; Arist. *Pol.* 1303a8–10) in maintaining permanent lists of men eligible for service as hoplites and in carrying out conscription solely on the basis of membership in an age-group.

While a considerable effort must have been required initially to gather the names and ages of all eligible hoplites so as to construct lists organized by age-group, once this was done each year's generals had only to keep these lists current.⁴⁷ This meant striking from them individuals who had died or become physically unfit for service, and removing the entire list of the oldest age-group, whose members had passed beyond the age of eligibility. The eponymic designation of the retiring hoplites was then available for reassignment to the incoming eighteen year olds; the Council, which was responsible for reviewing the lists of new ephebes submitted annually by the demes (*Ath. Pol.* 42.1–2, with Rhodes, 1972, 172), probably provided their names to the generals.

The new system not only kept track of the names of all eligible hoplites but also posted these near the Eponymoi. Individuals were listed by age-group and probably also by tribe within each age-group to facilitate consulting the list at the time of conscription and at muster, where hoplites continued to gather by tribe (D.S. 18.10.2; cf. Thphr. *Char.* 25.6). *Ath. Pol.* 53.4 indicates that the current practice was to devote a bronze *stèle* to each age-group but that previously whitened tablets had been used. The shift to the more expensive and durable medium of bronze suggests that beyond their practical function these *stelai* were meant to be striking monuments to the city's hoplite forces.⁴⁸

Because lists of eligible hoplites in each age-group were centrally posted, the generals could now initiate conscription simply by posting a notice in the vicinity of the whitened boards or bronze *stelai* that stated the years called upon to serve (*Ath. Pol.* 53.7). The monument of the Eponymoi was the natural place to post this notice. The bronze *stelai* were located 'next to these' (*Ath. Pol.* 53.4); bases for triangular bronze *stelai* have been found in this vicinity (Stroud, 1979, 49–57). Their predecessors, the whitened boards, were probably in the same area.

Ath. Pol. 53.7 suggests that the normal practice was to call up all those between two ages.⁴⁹ Consistent with this are three references to call-up by age-group from (probably) those aged twenty to some upper limit: Dem. 3.4–5 speaks of an unsuccessful call-up in 352/1 B.C. of men aged up to forty-five for a naval expedition; Aesch. 2.133 of a decree in 347/6 B.C. for conscription up to the age of forty (reading *τετταράκοντα*, with Dilts) for a naval expedition; D.S. 18.10.2 of a call-up to the

⁴⁷ The practice of assigning generals to particular posts ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1), which is first attested in the mid-fourth century B.C. (see Rhodes, 1981, 678–9), may have led to one general having primary responsibility for keeping lists updated.

⁴⁸ Rhodes (1981, 592) suggests that this shift may have accompanied reform of the *ephebeia* c. 335/4 B.C.

⁴⁹ In Sparta too conscription was carried out by age-ranges: see X. *Lac.* 11.2; cf. H.G. 6.4.17.

age of forty of hoplites for the Lamian War.⁵⁰ Because these call-ups involved mass mobilization of about half the age-groups, however, they obscure an important feature of this system, namely how it allows for equitable turn-taking by age-groups on smaller-scale expeditions. Mass mobilizations, in fact, are the exception rather than the rule in Athenian military history; normally, the generals only needed a fraction of eligible hoplites—a few thousand or less—to man an expedition. In such cases, the generals could now call up a small number of age-groups to serve and then, when the next small-scale expedition was planned, they could enlist different age-groups. This rotation among age-groups would ensure fair turn-taking within a given year and even over a period of years if, as is likely, the generals kept track of which age-groups had served recently.⁵¹

When the generals were calling up a small number of age-groups for service, however, they probably took care to avoid sending the youngest and least experienced age-groups by themselves. To achieve a desirable mix of ages that ensured the presence of veterans, the generals could probably call upon multiple age-ranges at the same time—for example, the age-ranges 20–22 and 30–32. The *Athenaion Politeia* does not rule this out; in explaining succinctly how the system worked, it focuses on the most straightforward use of it where only a single age-range is posted. The *Athenaion Politeia* does rule out, however, the possibility that age-groups were selected entirely by lot, as this would be inconsistent with the use of age-ranges.⁵² Although Athenians were fond of lotteries, a lottery would have been problematic in this context. First, this might lead to an unhappy preponderance of younger or older men. Second, the random selection of age-groups might create confusion concerning those called up: while those consulting the notice-board in person could establish directly whether they were among the conscripted age-groups, those hearing of the call-up by word of mouth—for example, in the outlying demes—might well receive garbled information since a list of random numbers could easily be confused in transmission.

While the new system probably retained some features of the earlier one—for example, the way that exemptions were handled—the features highlighted here distinguish the two arrangements clearly from one another.⁵³ Under conscription by *katalogos*, the generals were free to consider age, along with other factors, in selecting troops and could choose, for example, not to enlist eligible men over a certain age (cf. Hansen, 1985, 89). This feature of conscription by *katalogos* should not be confused, however, with the later arrangement, which kept track of men by age and conscripted them solely on this basis with others in their age-group: there is no convincing evidence

⁵⁰ In each of these three cases the upper age-limit is introduced by μέχρι: this probably means that conscription stopped just short of the upper age-limit, e.g. conscription 'up to age 40' means 'through age 39' (see Hansen, 1985, 100, n. 126 *contra* Ruschenbusch, 1984, 263). For the use of age-ranges in conscription, see also Plu. *Phoc.* 24.3–5; cf. Apollod. *Car. fr.* 5.19–20 K–A.

While both Dem. 3.4–5 and Aesch. 2.133 speak of naval expeditions, the individuals called up are probably hoplites, who could row themselves (cf. Thuc. 3.16.1, 18.3–4; Rosivach, 1985 [1992], 54–5) to the locations in question and then carry out the land operations planned in each case. D.S. 18.10.2 speaks of conscription of hoplites whose immediate task is to serve as a land force; later they may have helped man the fleet mentioned in the same passage (Sekunda, 1992, 348–51; but cf. Hansen, 1985, 38–9).

⁵¹ I argue below that Aesch. 2.168 provides an example of turn-taking on small expeditions.

⁵² Tritle (1988, 79) is mistaken in taking Dem. 39.17 as evidence of the use of the lot for determining which age-groups would be mobilized: in this passage λῆξις refers to a legal complaint not a military lottery.

⁵³ Scholars frequently conflate the two arrangements, e.g. Kromayer and Veith (1928), 47; A. H. M. Jones (1957), 163; Effenterre (1976), 15–16.

of record-keeping of this sort or call-up by age-group under conscription by *katalogos*.⁵⁴

Date of inception

When *Ath. Pol.* 53.4 distinguishes between the past use of whitened tablets for recording age-groups and the current use of bronze *stelai* for this, it indicates that the system of conscription by age-groups operating c. 330 B.C. had been in existence for some time. Other sources suggest that the age-group system was operating for several decades before 330 B.C. This is the most natural interpretation of the conscription involving age-ranges attested in Aesch. 2.133 (347/6 B.C.) and Dem. 3.4 (352/1 B.C.). Aesch. 2.167–9 allows us to take the reform back at least to 366 B.C.. Because this problematic passage is critical both to dating the reform and understanding its nature, I will consider it closely.

In his *On the Embassy* Aeschines defends himself at length against Demosthenes' snipes at his military service:

§167 . . . When I passed out of childhood [c. 372 B.C.], I became a border guard of this land for two years.⁵⁵ I will call my fellow ephebes (τοὺς συνεφήβους) and our officers as witnesses to this. §168 The first expedition I went on involved 'service in turns' as it is called (πρώτην δ' ἐξελθὼν στρατείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καλουμένην); I was with the other men of my age-group (μετὰ τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν) and Alcibiades' mercenary troops on a mission to escort provisions to Phlius [366 B.C.]. When we fell into danger near what is called (καλουμένην) the Nemean ravine, I fought so well that I won praise from my officers. I also went out on the other expeditions in succession, <all> those involving age-groups [and service in turns] (καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἐξόδους τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις [καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν] <πάσας> ἐξήλθον). §169 I fought in the battle of Mantinea [362 B.C.] honourably and in a manner worthy of our city. I went on the expeditions to Euboea [357 B.C.; 349/8 B.C.: cf. 3.85–6], and at the battle of Tamynae [349/8 B.C.] as one of the select troops (ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλέκτοις) I faced danger with such courage that I received a crown on the spot and another from the people on my return home; for I brought the news of the city's victory, and Menites, taxiarch of the tribe Pandionis, who accompanied me as envoy from the camp, reported here how I had acted in the face of the danger that had arisen. (2.167–9, following Dilts's Teubner text [Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1997])

In my view, Aeschines refers throughout this passage to conscription carried out by age-groups. If I am correct, the system was in existence by 366 B.C., the date of the first expedition that Aeschines mentions.

This interpretation goes against Andrewes's reading (1981) of this passage, which many scholars have accepted (e.g. Rhodes, 1981, 327; Hansen, 1985, 88; cf. Carey, 2000, 151, n. 219). Andrewes (1981, 1–2) takes στρατείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καλουμένην as a reference to turn-taking under conscription by *katalogos*, citing the generals' oath τοὺς ἀστρατεύτους καταλέγειν (Lys. 9.15) as evidence of this feature of the earlier system. Andrewes (1981, 2) suggests in addition: 'It perhaps accords with this that Aeschines adds the qualification καλουμένην to service ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι, as if that were the system less familiar to his hearers.'

⁵⁴ Hamel (1998a, 26, n. 74) calls attention to the problematic nature of some of the sources that might be adduced as evidence of call-up by age-group in the fifth century. Andrewes (1981, 2) points out that when Philochorus speaks of στρατεία ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις in his fourth book (*FGrH* 328 F 38, preserved in Harp. s.v., 279.6 Dindorf)—probably in connection with the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War—he is probably contrasting later practice with conscription by *katalogos*.

⁵⁵ Aeschines probably was born c. 390 B.C. (Harris, 1988) and began his ephebic service at the age of 18.

Significant objections can be raised to Andrewes's interpretation.⁵⁶ First, as Hamel observes (1998a, 27, n. 75), it is odd to take *στρατεῖαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καλουμένην* as a reference to conscription by *katalogos*, since Aeschines immediately states that under this arrangement he went on an expedition with men of his age. Indeed, the natural interpretation is that Aeschines is referring to the age-group system. In this case, when he speaks of service 'in turns', he is probably referring to the turn-taking by entire age-groups that was possible under the new system as suggested above. The expedition to Phlius apparently did not require a full levy of troops—only a partial levy supplemented by Alcibiades' mercenaries.⁵⁷ Aeschines' age-group, probably with others as well, sufficed on this occasion; other age-groups would take their turn the next time troops were needed. Aeschines may use the plural in the phrase *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* rather than the singular to emphasize that this turn-taking was by groups.⁵⁸

Further doubts concerning Andrewes's identification of *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* with conscription by *katalogos* are raised by the fact that, while this system of conscription is mentioned frequently in our sources, it is never characterized in these or similar terms. The only evidence that Andrewes cites in favour of his position is the generals' oath *τοὺς ἀστρατεύτους καταλέξειν* (Lys. 9.15). But the vague prescription to conscript (first) men who have not yet gone on an expedition falls short of one mandating turn-taking by all hoplites. In fact, the reference to *astrateutoi*, which is frequently pejorative, may indicate that this clause was included in the oath primarily as a precaution against draft-evasion.

A passage in Plato's *Laws* setting out rules for military service, moreover, suggests that conscription by *katalogos* and service 'in turn' are distinct alternatives: 'A man who has been conscripted by *katalogos* or called up to serve in turn in some way must perform military service' (*στρατεύεσθαι τὸν καταλεγέντα ἢ τὸν ἐν μέρει τινὶ τεταγμένον* 943a3–4). Plato draws on Athenian law in his treatment of military offences that follows⁵⁹ and is probably also thinking of Athens when he speaks of these alternative arrangements: by *τὸν καταλεγέντα* he is probably referring to conscription by *katalogos*, by service *ἐν μέρει τινὶ*, to conscription by age-group. The latter had probably replaced the former by the time Plato wrote the *Laws* late in his career, sometime before his death in 347 B.C.

The fact that we only begin hearing of military service 'in turn', variously expressed, in the mid-fourth century (*ἐν μέρει τινὶ*: Pl. *Lg.* 943a4) or in reference to this period (*ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι*: Aesch. 2.168) is in keeping with the identification of this terminology with the new system of conscription. Consistent with this is Demosthenes' proposal in

⁵⁶ Other interpretations of *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* are also not persuasive in my view. Kromayer and Veith (1928, 47–8; cf. Burckhardt, 1996, 21, with n. 33) take this as a reference to the selective call-up of entire tribal contingents when the whole levy was not required. This practice, however, is unattested and cannot be inferred from the fact that tribal contingents were sometimes deployed in different locations: such deployments took place only after conscription from all tribes had been carried out, as is clear from D.S. 18.10.2. C. D. Adams (*The Speeches of Aeschines* [Cambridge, MA, 1919], 287; cf. Carey, 2000, 151, n. 219) suggests that *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* refers to conscription of only part of an age-group, but this practice is also unattested.

⁵⁷ On this expedition, which was led by Chares, see X. *H. G.* 7.2.17–23; D.S. 15.75.3; Thompson (1983).

⁵⁸ *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* does not, as far as I can tell, appear in this sense before this point in Greek literature; it appears earlier but in a different sense in Pl. *Prm.* 145c8. See LSJ *μέρος* II.2 for expressions connoting 'turn-taking' formed from various prepositions, including *ἐν*, in combination with *μέρος* in the singular.

⁵⁹ While Plato does not follow Athenian law precisely here (cf. Hamel, 1998b, 385–6), he appears to be influenced strongly by it (see Saunders, 1991, 324–8).

349/8 B.C. that the Athenians should support Olynthus through an expedition in which 'all should serve in turn (*κατὰ μέρος*) until all have taken part in the campaign' (2.31).

If we accept that Aeschines' service in 366 B.C. *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* was under the age-group system, this means that all of the service he describes subsequently in his military autobiography was under the same system of conscription. This is true whether we reject or accept *καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν* later in §168 when—according to the manuscripts—Aeschines characterizes his service on expeditions in the period 362–349/8 B.C. as *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν*. Dilts, in his Teubner edition, follows Hamaker in bracketing *καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν*, leaving us with a reference to conscription by age-group in *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις*; this designation, as the lexicographers noted (e.g. Harp. s.v. *στρατεία ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις* = 279.6 Dindorf), is consistent with the conspicuous role of the forty-two eponymous heroes in the age-group system as described in *Ath. Pol.* 53.4, 7.⁶⁰

If, however, Aeschines actually wrote *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν*, this would still mean—according to my interpretation of *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* earlier in §168—that he was conscripted by age-group in the period 362–349/8 B.C.. In this case, Aeschines has designated the new system, for which there may have been no single, recognizable name in general use, by two of its attributes. Consistent with this flexible nomenclature is its designation earlier in the passage by one of these phrases (*ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι*) qualified by *καλουμένην* taken in the sense 'so-called'.⁶¹ The form of the phrase *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν* also may support the view that Aeschines is referring through two attributes to a single method of conscription: the omission of a second *ἐν* could make the two nouns '(whether similar or dissimilar in meaning) unite to form a complex' (Smyth, 1667b); if Aeschines had meant to distinguish the two, as he might have if they referred to different systems, he could have repeated the preposition and linked them with, for example, *τε . . . καί* (cf. Smyth, 1667a).⁶²

If we accept the entire phrase *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν* as part of our text, as many have, and take the two components to be attributes of the same system of conscription as I have argued, we can avoid an unhappy consequence of Andrewes's

⁶⁰ If *καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν* is an intrusion, my interpretation of *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* earlier in the passage as a reference to the age-group system could explain how it found its way into our text: it derives from a marginal gloss on *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις* that correctly links this phrase with *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* since both refer to the same system.

⁶¹ Andrewes (1981, 2) is rightly cautious in attributing this sense to *καλουμένην*, since it could simply indicate that the prepositional phrase constitutes a designation ('called'). Later in the passage Aeschines uses the identical form when naming the Nemean ravine: assuming that dittography is not behind the repetition, in this case Aeschines may be using it in the sense 'so-called' as the Nemean ravine may have been unfamiliar to some in his audience.

⁶² One might wonder why Aeschines would refer to the system first with *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* and then later with *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν*, since it might make more sense to describe it first by two attributes and later in abbreviated manner by just one of these. One explanation is that Aeschines thought *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι* was more significant as an attribute since it describes the principle on which the new system was based, whereas *ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις* merely describes the mechanism of the forty-two eponymous heroes by which it was carried out. A rhetorical motivation may also lie behind his highlighting this feature first: because Aeschines is defending himself against Demosthenes' slur against his service as soldier (Aesch. 2.167), he wants to emphasize that he served 'in turn'. This would also provide a defence against the possible charge that he did not go out on *all* expeditions after completing his two years of ephebic service. This possibility makes me uncomfortable with Dilts's insertion of *πάσας* later in §168 when Aeschines refers to his service in the period 362–349/8 B.C.: Aeschines may well be making his claim to model service carefully, asserting that he went on successive expeditions whenever called up 'in turn' under the eponymic system, not that he went on every single expedition during this period.

interpretation of ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι early in §168 as a reference to conscription by *katalogos*—namely that Aeschines was conscripted both under the age-group system (ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις) and by *katalogos* (καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν) in the period 362–349/8 B.C. Hansen (1985, 89), accepting Andrewes's interpretation, infers that the old and new arrangements must have overlapped for some time.⁶³ Once we take away this pivotal passage, however, the other three pieces of evidence Hansen cites in favour of a mixed-system carry little weight.

1. Although Dem. 50.6 (cf. 50.16) speaks of the compilation of *katalogoi* in 362/1 B.C., this is specifically for conscription of sailors (ναῦται), most of whom were probably thetes (cf. Hansen, 1985, 110, n. 245; Rhodes, 1981, 327).⁶⁴ The names of thetes had to be gathered on lists based on the deme rolls—just as formerly the conscription of hoplites had been carried out—because they did not appear on the lists of hoplites organized by age-group posted in the Agora by this time.⁶⁵
2. Dem. 13.4 in 354/3 B.C. proposes paying all those of military age for military service, and paying τοὺς δ' ὑπὲρ τὸν κατάλογον for their non-military services. The fact that this is a proposal makes the relation of its elements to the status quo uncertain; if τοὺς δ' ὑπὲρ τὸν κατάλογον implies making a list of those of military age, this would be a new list distinct from any existing lists of hoplites since it would include thetes as well as hoplites (cf. Hansen, 1985, 86–7).
3. Mantitheus protests in Dem. 39.8 (348 B.C.) that there will be great confusion if his half-brother continues usurping his name, since it will not be clear which of the two is 'the one conscripted' (ὁ κατειλεγμένος) in the event of an expedition. This need not be taken as a reference to conscription by *katalogos*. καταλέγω was flexible—it was also used in speaking of conscription of men for the cavalry (e.g. Lys. 16.13) and of trierarchs ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1)—and therefore probably continued to be used under the age-group system to describe conscription; no new verb was coined to describe the new arrangement as far as we know.⁶⁶

Since we have no compelling evidence of conscription of hoplites by *katalogos* after 366 B.C., and good reason to believe the new arrangement was operating by this date, we should abandon the idea that the two systems overlapped for some time. Practical considerations also favour a clean transition between the two. Once the names of

⁶³ Hansen's inference, however, does not follow necessarily from Andrewes's interpretation: Aeschines could mean *à la* Andrewes that he served first by *katalogos* and later by age-group in the period 362–349/8 B.C. (cf. Ober, 1985, 96).

⁶⁴ Unlike the naval expeditions discussed above (n. 50) in which hoplites apparently rowed themselves to distant locations so as to fight on land, the expedition described in Dem. 50 appears to have been primarily a naval one (50.4–6) requiring sailors rather than hoplites; as was normal in such situations a small contingent of *epibatai* accompanied each ship (50.10, 25, etc.).

⁶⁵ If thetes ever became eligible for hoplite service (see above, n. 30), this probably did not happen until after the battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.), perhaps in conjunction with the ephebic reforms of c. 335/4 B.C.

⁶⁶ Hansen (1985, 110, n. 248) argues that Mantitheus' argument makes sense only if conscripts were listed deme-by-deme on *katalogoi* rather than by age-group, since under the latter arrangement the two half-brothers of identical name could have been distinguished from one another by their different ages. Mantitheus' argument, however, could still be valid under conscription by age-group since identical names could cause confusion at least initially. In any case, Mantitheus may well assume that his assertion, which is part of a long list of possible confusions resulting from the current situation, will not be put to such close scrutiny.

eligible conscripts were readily available on the lists of the forty-two age-groups, there was no reason for the generals to create further work for themselves by sometimes generating the old-style *katalogoi*.

Thus far, we have established that conscription by age-group dates back at least to 366 B.C. How much farther back can it be dated? Conscription by *katalogos* was still operating at the start of the Corinthian War (Lys. 15.5; 14.6; cf. Carey, 1989, 141) and probably continued to be used throughout it (395–386 B.C.).⁶⁷ Although Diodorus Siculus speaks of the Athenian general Demophon conscripting (καταλέξας) 5,000 hoplites in 378/7 B.C. (15.26.2) and of the Athenians voting to conscript (καταλέξαι) 20,000 hoplites in 377/6 B.C. (15.29.7), we cannot rely on the precision of his terminology. Even if Diodorus' source used these terms, it may have been using καταλέγω with reference to conscription by age-group. On balance then, it is best to date the reform approximately to the period 386–366 B.C.

SIGNIFICANCE OF REFORM

Why did Athenians abandon conscription by *katalogos* and replace it with conscription by age-groups in the period 386–366 B.C.? While we do not know the circumstances in which the Assembly approved this reform, its most striking features suggest that military and ideological considerations worked together to bring about the change. The new system had two conspicuous advantages over its predecessor: it allowed speedier mobilization and was more equitable. Athenians had good reason to seek both improvements at this time.

Military considerations

In the first decades of the fourth century B.C., Athens sought to re-establish its power and prestige after its defeat in the Peloponnesian War and in the face of new threats from abroad. An integral part of this was innovation in the military sphere, including reform of how hoplites were trained and conscripted.

It was probably during this period that Athenians made two years of military service and training obligatory for eighteen year olds of hoplite status. Aeschines suggests in his military autobiography that this was the normal arrangement by the time he began his two years of service c. 372 B.C. with his fellow ephebes (2.167, quoted above); he treats his service as routine and does not seek special credit for it, as he does later in the same excursus for his exceptional role as one of the *epilektoi* at Tamynae (2.169). While an ephebic system of some sort was probably in place already in the late-fifth century, the new arrangement probably innovated in extending service to two years and in modifying the form of training during this period (cf. Ober, 1985, 90–5).⁶⁸ Concern over the city's military readiness in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War was probably a primary motivation behind reform of the *ephebeia*; likewise after another great defeat—at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.—Athenians further refined the ephebic system (Harp. s.v. 'Επικράτης = 126.2 Dindorf) (Hansen, 1991, 89; cf. Rhodes, 1981, 494–5). Furthermore, the increasing professionalization of Greek military forces, including the rising use of mercenaries, may have made Athenians more conscious of

⁶⁷ Conscription by *katalogos* was operating in the time of Lys. 9 (*For the Soldier*), which may date to the Corinthian War as MacDowell (1994, 153) suggests.

⁶⁸ For arguments in favour of an early *ephebeia*, see esp. Pélékidis (1962), 71–9 and Reinmuth (1971), 123–38. For a survey of scholarship on the *ephebeia*, see Raaflaub (1996), 157, with 172, nn. 148–9.

the importance of having a better-trained hoplite force. The ephebes, moreover, could garrison the expanding network of rural forts in Attica during their second year of service ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.4; Ober, 1985, 97–9).

Complementary to the city's efforts to improve the quality of its hoplites by modifying the ephebic system was its reform of conscription to allow speedier mobilization of troops.⁶⁹ The new arrangement must have speeded up considerably the process of conscription and thus mobilization. The generals no longer had to wait for lists to come in from the demes or spend time, once these arrived, in selecting individual conscripts; because lists organized by age-group were already at hand and conscription was by group, the generals had merely to choose which groups to conscript. In an age of widespread military innovation in the Greek world, as the fourth century was, Athenian efforts to improve the speed of mobilization may require little explanation: any measure to improve the city's military effectiveness may have been welcome. A specific motivation behind the reform, however, may have been the desire to provide for speedy response to enemy incursions into Attica so as to avoid the damage and humiliation such incursions had brought during the Peloponnesian War (Ober, 1985, 13–66).

These reforms of ephebic service and conscription shared not only the goal of producing a more effective hoplite force but also, notably, a reliance on age-groups. This is apparent in Aeschines' military autobiography quoted above: the orator speaks of his service as border guard with his fellow ephebes—who were certainly of the same age as himself (cf. 1.49)—and then immediately of conscription by age-group carried out several years later in which he served with men of his age (2.167–8), as if the latter followed naturally upon the former. Although this affinity could mean that the two reforms were instituted simultaneously, the fact that we do not hear of a single far-reaching reform may mean that one reform drew on the other in employing age-groups. Ephebic reform may have been the earlier of the two: the need to keep track of ephebes entering their two years of mandatory service could have prompted special measures for recording the names of each ephebic class, which consisted of individuals of the same age; when conscription by age-group was initiated, it then built on this pre-existing arrangement.⁷⁰

This view of conscription by age-group as an improvement over its predecessor and one well-suited to the city's changing circumstances is at odds with Tritle's negative assessment of it: 'Generals surely found in their ranks men called out for service who were physically unfit, untrained, and/or unmotivated' (Tritle, 1989, 56); to remedy the problem of 'low grade troops', Athenians established 'a permanent elite force, the *epilektoi*' analogous to those attested in some other Greek states;⁷¹ thus (57) 'when an expeditionary force was called out, the generals could expect to command not only those age groups summoned, but also the *epilektoi*, a veteran force of dependable fighters'. This reading of the new system of conscription and its consequences is, however, unpersuasive.

First, we have no reason to believe that conscription by age-group lowered the

⁶⁹ On the possible link between reform of the *ephebeia* and the new method of conscription, see Hansen (1985), 89 and Ober (1985), 90–6.

⁷⁰ Another possible inspiration for using age-groups in conscription was the requirement, starting in 399/8 B.C. (see above, n. 28), that Athenians in their sixtieth year serve as arbitrators; this would make it necessary to keep track of at least older Athenians by age-group. Note the close connection in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.4–7 between the use of age-groups for designating arbitrators and conscripting hoplites.

⁷¹ Cf. Tritle (1988), 77–9. On elite forces attested outside Athens, see Pritchett (1974), 2.221–5.

quality of Athenian hoplite forces. The only evidence Tritle (1989, 56, with n. 16) cites for this is an anecdote in Plutarch concerning poor discipline among Athenian troops in 349/8 B.C. (*Phoc.* 12.3).⁷² Disciplinary problems, however, were probably also common when conscription by *katalogos* was in use; discipline was a challenge in citizen armies in general (see Pritchett, 1974, 2.232–45; Hamel, 1998a, 59–64). Moreover, ephebic training was probably in place in some form from the inception of conscription by age-groups as argued above, ensuring that conscripts had a common core of experience and were thus not ‘untrained’. Since compulsion was integral to both systems, both had to deal with the problem of ‘unmotivated’ soldiers. Conscription by age-groups, however, may have been superior to its predecessor in dealing with this challenge: by making conscription fairer (see below), it may well have improved morale among the conscripted.

Second, Tritle’s argument that Athenians responded to the alleged difficulties posed by the new system with the establishment of a permanent force of *epilektoi* is not compelling. The only evidence before 330 B.C. that Tritle cites for such a force refers to the Athenian use of *epilektoi* at the Battle of Tamynae (Aesch. 2.169, quoted above; Plu. *Phoc.* 13.5). The two passages cited, however, say nothing about this force being permanent, and Aeschines in fact appears to rule this out: he generalizes that he served repeatedly under the age-group system (2.168) and then immediately substantiates this by citing the expeditions he went on in the period 362–349/8 B.C. (2.169); the fact that his service as *epilektos* is included within this list suggests that he had already been conscripted by age-group *before* being selected to serve with the *epilektoi*. This is consistent with the well-established practice in Athens of selecting forces to be used for special purposes from those already conscripted: the fifth-century convention was to label these forces *logades*, the fourth-century one, *epilektoi*—this shift in terms, which is noted by Tritle (1989, 56, n. 13), may simply reflect changing usage rather than institutional innovation. Inscriptions beginning c. 330 B.C. honouring *epilektoi* or erected by them (adduced by Tritle, 1989, 54–5, with nn. 5, 6, 8) need not imply that a standing and/or separate corps existed even by this time. If, however, Athenians had established a separate élite corps of *epilektoi* by this late date, this could be explained by their desire to gain an extra edge in battle rather than despair at the low quality of regular conscripts under conscription by age-group.

Ideological considerations

While military concerns may have been the primary impetus behind the reform of conscription, the reform’s attention to equity suggests that concerns over fairness played an important role. Athenians, after all, could have improved the speed of mobilization by a less dramatic reform of conscription by *katalogos*, for example by maintaining a central, up-to-date register of potential conscripts. Significantly, however, they chose instead to speed up mobilization through a system that also distributed more fairly among citizens the obligation to risk life in battle.

Conscription by age-group, with its reliance on age as the sole criterion for calling up men of hoplite status for service, was much more equitable than its predecessor, which left selection of conscripts largely to the generals’ discretion. The new arrangement was manifestly fair in ensuring that individuals of the same age would always serve simultaneously; no longer would one man serve while a qualified individual of

⁷² Tritle cites D.S. 18.17.1 as evidence of ‘similar conduct for the Greeks during the Lamian War’.

identical age remained at home. It was also fair in providing a mechanism for ensuring that younger men, who were more able to serve, would be called up more frequently than their elders;⁷³ the complaints about 'old men' serving under conscription by *katalogos* noted above suggest that this could be a sore point under the earlier arrangement. Furthermore, the new arrangement provided a mechanism for distributing the onus of military duty equitably among different age-groups when a full levy was not required: the generals could call up age-groups to serve 'in turn'. If the generals did not do this fairly, they risked the outcry of an entire age-group. By contrast, under conscription by *katalogos* if an individual—like Lysias' client Polyaeus (Lys. 9)—felt he was being called on to serve too soon after returning from a campaign, he had little recourse if the generals dismissed his complaint.

While this move toward fairness in conscription is consistent with the egalitarianism of Athenian democracy, it is reasonable to ask why Athenians finally reformed conscription in this way after living for so long with the inequities of the earlier system. Reform may have been in response to rising tensions concerning conscription in the decades following the city's defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Individuals eligible for hoplite service were more likely to be called up to serve when a campaign was initiated, since the Peloponnesian War had seriously reduced Athenian manpower and thus the pool of eligible hoplites. At the same time, conscripts may have been more reluctant to go out on campaign. Financial hardship appears to have been widespread at this time (Strauss, 1987, 55–7); this could make a conscript more anxious about his family's welfare during his absence and more conscious of their plight should he die in battle. Service abroad may also have lost some of its allure due to the city's changing circumstances: whereas fifth-century Athenians had good reason to fight to preserve the empire from which so many of them benefited, many of their fourth-century progeny may have been more sceptical concerning the benefits of foreign enterprises. While Athenian recourse to mercenaries at this time may have helped alleviate tensions concerning conscription somewhat, the city was far from relying exclusively on mercenaries (Pritchett, 1974, 2.104–10; Burckhardt, 1996, 139–40) and still needed a conscription system that would reduce tensions in these difficult circumstances. Conscription by age-groups, with its equitable features, provided just such a system.

This egalitarian reform of conscription can be viewed as part of a broader trend to distribute the obligations of citizenship more equitably under the pressures of harder times. In roughly the same period in which Athenians acted to distribute the duty of hoplite service more equitably through 'turn-taking', financial pressures on the wealthy prompted reform of the way financial obligations were distributed among them. In 378/7 B.C. Athenians established tax-groups, *summorai*, for the payment of the war-tax (*eisphora*), and c. 357 B.C. *summorai* for funding and carrying out trierarchies. As with the reform of conscription, the city probably had a dual purpose in making these changes: to ensure that institutions associated with the city's military efforts function efficiently and that individuals bear their civic responsibilities in a manifestly equitable way.⁷⁴

Demosthenes taps the spirit of egalitarianism behind both types of reform in summarizing how his proposed expedition to Olynthus should be carried out (349/8 B.C.): 'In sum, I propose that all should pay the war-tax equitably, each according to his means, and that all should go out on campaign in turn (*κατὰ μέρος*) until you all have

⁷³ The limited empirical evidence, which refers to the conscription of younger age-groups (Dem. 3.4–5; Aesch. 2.133; D.S. 18.10.2—all discussed above in the text), is consistent with this.

⁷⁴ On these reforms, see esp. Gabrielsen (1994), 182–99.

served' (2.31; cf. 2.13). Demosthenes thus suggests that, while citizens should serve their city patriotically, they should do so equitably, with each doing his fair share rather than shouldering others' obligations.

How Athens conscripted hoplites was critical not only for the success of its military but also for the way individuals of hoplite status—an élite within the larger citizen body—understood their relation to the city and their responsibilities as citizens. Viewed in this light, the Athenian reform of conscription in the period 386–366 B.C. represents a significant innovation in establishing an institutional structure for distributing equitably the duty to serve on the battlefield. Like contemporary reform of how financial obligations were distributed among wealthy citizens, this reform sought to ensure that citizens contribute their fair share to civic life. The patriotic rhetoric of the *epitaphioi* called upon citizens to contribute unstintingly toward the common good (Thuc. 2.43.1; cf. Ar. *Lys.* 651). Pragmatic legislation, however, accepted the fact that citizens were conscious of the relative sizes of their contributions to the city (cf. Ar. *Ec.* 746–833) and it sought therefore to ensure equity among these.*

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